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THE MIRROR HAS MANY FACES:  




Owing to our failure to acknowledge the complexity and diversity of 
gender identity, gender and gender politics are contentious subjects in 
Canadian anti-discrimination law. On the one hand, Queer theorists 
continue to challenge the rigidity of the male/female binary, while on the 
other hand, Canadian law insists that identity is invariably determined 
by one’s biological sex. The result is a power struggle, pitting those who 
ÀW QHDWO\ LQWR ULJLG PDOHIHPDOH FDWHJRULHV DJDLQVW WKH PDUJLQDOL]HG
Other—the transgendered community. 
Transgendered persons have encountered many barriers in their search 
for equality in the law, partly owing to a lack of a proper legal foundation 
on which to base their discrimination claims. This paper argues that 
the failure of the already established grounds of discrimination to fully 
protect and represent transgendered persons requires Canadian anti-
discrimination law to incorporate gender identity as a new ground of 
discrimination.
† Frank Durnford (B.A. (Hons.), Memorial University of Newfoundland) will enter his third 
year at Dalhousie Law School in September 2005.
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$QGVLQFH\RXNQRZ\RXFDQQRWVHH\RXUVHOIVRZHOODVE\UHÁHFWLRQ 
I, your glass, will modestly discover to yourself,  
that of yourself which you know not of.
— Julius Caesar, Act I, scene ii
Anti-discrimination law in Canada has proven itself to be a site of con-
WHQWLRQZLWKUHVSHFWWRJHQGHUDQGJHQGHUSROLWLFVIDLOLQJWRUHÁHFWWKH
complexity and diversity of gender identity. While gender and Queer 
theorists continue to deconstruct our social and cultural notions of gen-
der and identity, Canadian law insists that the “discovery” of biological 
sex is the construction of identity. From biological sex, the law con-
structs a normative identity – how we should look, act, and feel, which 
in turn informs the jurisprudence of gender discrimination. Such an as-
sumption implicitly asserts that there are but two genders, male and 
female, and that the world is necessarily constructed on that premise. 
However, as Gloria Anzaldúa observes, the very creation of a gendered 
frontier rouses the possibility of an other.1 The gendered Other, the 
transgendered, exists in law in marginalized and unprivileged spaces, 
outside of and dominated by the male/female binary.
Therein lies the primary battleground of Queer theorists, who reject 
the belief that gender identity is a natural event, coinciding with birth and 
biological sex. Queer Theory generates a discourse wherein fundamen-
tal categories of identity, such as gender, are cultural and social produc-
tions, or in other words, performative.2 While biological sex anticipates 
the normative gender role and identity of a person, these are behaviours 
and actions that must be learned. To follow Michel Foucault’s illustra-
tion, the individual or the body is “the inscribed surface of events,” the 
site where history and present converge and are coloured by race, class, 
geography, culture, sexuality, and of course, gender.3 
Yet, transgendered persons are forced to modify their own self im-
age, often their bodies, in order to conform and be accepted into the 
male/female paradigm. Self-revision is equally necessary if the trans-
1 Gloria Anzaldúa, “Borderlands/La Frontera” in Vincent Leitch, ed., Norton Anthology of The-
ory and Criticism (New York: Norton, 2001) 2211 at 2213.
2 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997) at 102.
3 Judith Butler, “Gender Trouble” in Vincent Leitch, ed., Norton Anthology of Theory and Criti-
cism, (New York: Norton, 2001) 2488 at 2498.
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gendered person is to succeed in seeking protection under Canada’s 
anti-discrimination regime, where claims hinge on evoking enumerated 
or analogous grounds of discrimination. The struggle, then, is a power 
struggle in which transgendered people must resist both the imposed 
gender binary and the notion that transgenderism is a disease or problem 
to be remedied. Marjorie Garber proposes that “to change gender is to 
slide along a power differential,” whereas “to change power is to change 
gender.”4
Changing gender, then, is a necessary undertaking in order to ensure 
equality of the marginalized Other. It involves recognizing the inad-
equacy of a number of grounds as they relate to transgenderism, keeping 
in mind that grounds themselves are not ineffectual. Indeed, grounds as 
a mechanism in the operation of anti-discrimination law are quite neces-
sary. Grounds, however, must be assigned and developed cognisant of 
the political power struggles anti-discrimination law hopes to balance. 
Recent jurisprudence demonstrates exactly how narrow a view Ca-
nadian anti-discrimination law has adopted of gender, but also how the 
transgendered Other continues to challenge our rigid conceptions of 
gender and identity. To fully protect transgendered persons in the man-
ner intended by human rights legislation and the Charter, it is crucial 
WKDWWKHODZFUHDWHDVDIHWHUULWRU\WKDWUHÁHFWVWKHIUDFWXUHGUHDOLW\RIWKH
gendered Other. Gender dysphoria must be embraced, not as deviant or 
perverse behaviour, but as a very real and nuanced identity experience, 
with not one or two, but many expressions. The failure of the already es-
tablished grounds of discrimination to fully protect and represent trans-
gendered persons requires that Canadian anti-discrimination law adopt 
gender identity as a new ground.
4 Marjorie Garber, Vested Interests: Cross-dressing and Cultural Anxiety, (New York: Routledge, 
1992) as cited in Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest of Us, (New 
York: Routledge, 1994) at 97.
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I. GENDER BORDER CROSSING
“Who are YOU?” said the Caterpillar. 
 Alice replied, rather shyly,  
“I--I hardly know, sir, just at present— 
at least I know who I WAS when I got up this morning,  
but I think I must have been changed several times since then.”
— Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
The problem which many Queer theorists address is that gender dys-
phoria is considered abnormal, a disorder that needs to be treated, if not 
cured, thereby leading Queer theorists to challenge the boundaries of not 
only gender, but of normalcy itself.5 Anything which seemingly deviates 
from the background norm of the male/female binary and its prescribed 
gender roles and identity is deemed defective and perverse. As noted 
earlier, society expects congruence between biological sex and gender, 
and it expects that if there is gender dysphoria it should be corrected. 
This adoption of a false reality is not supported by Queer theorists. In 
her work Compulsory Heterosexuality, Adrienne Rich argues that “the 
retreat into sameness – assimilation for those who can manage it, is the 
most passive and debilitating of responses to political oppression, [and] 
economic insecurity.”6 Such a retreat is a concession to marginalization 
DQGWREHLQJGHÀQHGDQGUHJXODWHGDJDLQVWDEDFNJURXQGQRUP
The background norm then, is essentially a power-based ideology 
that is fundamentally linked to the gender binary. Foucault observes 
WKDW´SRZHULV WUDGLWLRQDOO\VHHQDVUHSUHVVLQJEHKDYLRXUVWKDW LWÀQGV
unproductive, threatening, or otherwise undesirable.”7 Power is exerted 
to repress so-called abnormal gender behaviour in the same way it is ex-
HUWHGWRUHSUHVVKLJKZD\WUDIÀFYLRODWLRQVRUWD[IUDXGXOWLPDWHO\PDU-
ginalizing such behaviour, making transgendered persons powerless. 
7KHJHQGHUELQDU\SURPRWHVDFODVVLÀFDWLRQRIFLWL]HQVDVPDOHIHPDOH
DQGRWKHUZKLFKLQWXUQHQFRXUDJHVWKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGVROLGLÀFDWLRQ
5 Carl Stychin, “Essential Rights and Contested Identities: Sexual Orientation and Equality 
Rights Jurisprudence in Canada” (1995) 8 Can. J. L. & Juris. 49 at 61.
6 Adrienne Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” in Vincent Leitch, ed., 
Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (New York: Norton, 2001) 1762 at 1763.
7 Supra note 3 at 1619. 
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of an oppressive class system made all the more dangerous by the belief 
that it is an entirely natural state of affairs.8 
Our society’s institutions are founded upon this system, which es-
sentially recognizes the male/female gender binary, but does not pro-
vide space for the other, the marginalized transgendered community. 
Queer Theory aims to subvert this structure, to blur the lines of gender 
identity by stretching gender borders. As Kate Bornstein notes, “a group 
UHPDLQVDJURXSE\EHLQJLQÁH[LEOHRQFHLWVWUHWFKHVLWVERUGHUVLW·VQR
longer the same group.”9 The goal, then, as explained by cultural theo-
rist Marjorie Garber, is the proliferation of the third, “that which ques-
tions binary thinking and introduces crisis…the “third” is a mode of 
articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility.”10 In effect, the 
goal is not only to avoid assimilation into the male/female paradigm, but 
to deconstruct it altogether in favour of a gender that is multi-faceted, 
dynamic, and most certainly realistic.
As mentioned earlier, Garber’s own argument is that “to change gen-
der is to slide along a power differential. To change power is to change 
gender.”11 Whether the transsexual who undergoes sex reassignment 
surgery (SRS) or the butch lesbian who dons the garb and mannerisms 
of a male, changing gender is simply further imbedding themselves in 
the hierarchy, and therefore subjecting themselves to the power strug-
gle.12 Described by Adrienne Rich as the “retreat into sameness,” such a 
change in gender is merely a shift from the space of the third to actively 
and tenaciously holding the central dominating discourse in place. 13 It 
is not a power gain, nor does it legitimize the marginalized voices of 
WKRVHZKRGRQRWRUFDQQRWÀWLQWRWKHELQDU\PRGHO,QVWHDGRIDGYRFDW-
8 Bornstein, supra note 4 at 105.
9 Ibid. at 92.
10 Supra note 4 at 105.
11 Supra note 4 at 105.
12 Terri Webb, in Richard Ekins and Dave King, eds., Blending Genders: Social Aspects of 
Cross-dressing and Sex-changing, (NewYork: Routledge, 1996) at 193, expresses the belief that 
all male transsexuals do violence to women and themselves in their need to adopt a women’s 
VNLQ7KHHIIRUWWREHFRPHIHPDOHUHÁHFWVWKHGHVLUHWRRZQDIHPDOHERG\WRRZQIHPDOHHPR-
tions; an act which is not dissimilar to a “healthy” heterosexual male’s desire to own women in 
a possessive and misogynist sense. Likewise, as female transsexuals or transgendered lesbians 
try to assimilate maleness, they try to assimilate power, recognizing the lack of power possessed 
by their female bodies. 
13 Rich, supra note 6 at 1763.
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ing change, the adoption of one gender is the proliferation of the many 
silences at the periphery of accepted human behaviour. The solution 
WKHQ LV WRGHI\ WKHPRGHO ,Q)LQGLQJ2XU3ODFHEDUEDUDÀQGOD\DQG
Sandra LaFramboise suggest that “our culture should re-invent itself 
as a rainbow to incorporate transgender, instead of a black and white 
dichotomy.”14 Similarly, Bornstein emphasises that “there is no gender 
LQHTXLW\WKDWGRHVQRWÀUVWDVVXPHWKHUHLVJHQGHU²DQGRQO\WZRJHQ-
ders at that.”15 To that end, the power imbalance can only be corrected 
when our notions of gender are broadened, recognizing that congruency 
is not the ‘natural’ norm. We must depart from our boxes, stray from 
linear thinking, and insist our cultural institutions see gender not as the 
one-dimensional result of biology, but as the ongoing result of the rela-
tionship between biology, history, and culture.
II. CRITICAL MANEUVERING
“If homosexuality is a disease,
then we should all call in queer to work.
“Hello? Work? Yeah, can’t come in today…
yeah, still queer.”
— Robyn Tyler, activist [emphasis added]
+DYLQJLGHQWLÀHGWKHFULVLVLWEHFRPHVQHFHVVDU\WRORFDWHLWVDUWLFXOD-
WLRQLQUHDOVRFLDOSUDFWLFH)RUWKHVSHFLÀFSXUSRVHVRIWKLVGLVFXVVLRQ
the questions stand: how does the gender power struggle play out in 
law, what questions does it raise as to the legitimacy of the law, and, 
more importantly, can the law begin to embark on the path of respond-
ing to Queer Theory? The answers to these questions are closely linked 
with the position of the Canadian legal community in the essentialist/
constructionist dialogue and will inevitably require a change in our ap-
proach to Charter16 and human rights law, such that “gender identity” be 
established as a ground of discrimination.
14EDUEDUDÀQGOD\DQG6DQGUD/DIUDPERLVH´)LQGLQJ2XU3ODFH7UDQVJHQGHUHG/DZ5HIRUP
Project” in Law Reform Project (Vancouver: High Risk Project Society, 1996) at 15.
15 Supra note 8 at 115.
16 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c.C-12 [Charter].
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%HIRUHHPEDUNLQJRQVXFKDSDWK,WKLQNLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRÀUVWDF-
knowledge another dialogue which is part of the larger, contemporary 
discussion of grounds. In Egan v. Canada, the dissenting judgment of 
Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé attempts to revisit the “fundamental 
purpose of section 15 of the Charter” in a manner that places a great 
deal of emphasis on the protection of, and respect for, basic human dig-
nity.176SHFLÀFDOO\/·+HXUHX['XEp-DUJXHV WKDWDGHÀQLWLRQRIGLV-
crimination should focus on “impact (i.e. discriminatory effect) rather 
than on constituent elements (i.e. the grounds of the distinction) and 
that the former must be considered with respect to the perspective of the 
victim.18 While the judgment of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Egan does even-
tually help shape the discussion of step three of the section 15 analysis 
in Law, parts of the judgment have nonetheless met with criticism. 
In particular, the suggestion is made by L’Heureux-Dubé J. that: 
…the effect of the ‘enumerated or analogous grounds’ approach 
may be to narrow the ambit of section 15, and to encourage too 
much analysis at the wrong level…By looking at the grounds for the 
distinction instead of at the impact of the distinction on particular 
groups, we risk understanding an analysis that is distanced and 
desensitized from real people’s real experiences.19 
Arguably, then, L’Heureux-Dubé J. is suggesting an approach that is 
more liberal in its scope, focusing on the autonomous individual, her 
sense of human dignity, and her right to not have that infringed. Such an 
approach could plausibly generate a shift away from grounds, the basis 
of discrimination, to a discussion that focuses on simply the effects, or 
the aftermath of discrimination. Dianne Pothier argues that this actually 
detracts from the goals of anti-discrimination law and that we should be 
FRQFHQWUDWLQJRQGHYHORSLQJD´IXOOHUDSSUHFLDWLRQRI WKHVLJQLÀFDQFH
and complicated nature of grounds.”20 
As Pothier rightfully notes, “grounds of discrimination are not a 
SXUHO\ OHJDO FRQVWUXFW«>WKH\@ UHÁHFW D SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO UHDOLW\ WR
17 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 542 (SCC) [Egan].
18 Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (SCC) [Law].
19 Supra note 17 at 545 [emphasis in original].
20 Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences.” 
(2001)13 Can. J. W. & L. 38 at 39.
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which the law has, belatedly, given recognition.”21 Grounds are essen-
tial to anti-discrimination law, as it operates at the moment. A ground 
of discrimination, from its conception to its implementation, (ideally) 
becomes a space in which the struggles of marginalized communities 
and discourses may be articulated in a legal context. That there is a 
ground such as sex is indicative of the real people who are subject to a 
real power struggle and who experience real discrimination. The exist-
ence of that particular struggle is acknowledged and understood in law 
through that particular ground. Sherene Razack suggests in her book 
Looking White People in the Eye that “without an understanding of how 
responses to subordinate groups are socially organized to sustain exist-
ing power arrangements, we cannot hope either to communicate across 
social hierarchies or to work to eliminate them.”22 It is equally important 
WKHQWKDWJURXQGVQRWEHVWDWLFRUKLVWRULFDOO\À[HGLFRQVRIGLVFULPLQD-
tion. Rather, grounds should be maintained through constant vigilance, 
countering shifts in political power relationships that are manipulated 
by history, culture, and social change. 
If we are to gain anything from Butler’s notion of performative gen-
der, it is necessary to understand that gender is not historically and geo-
JUDSKLFDOO\À[HG5DWKHUDVDQDFTXLUHGVRFLDOLGHQWLW\LWLVKLVWRULFDOO\
and geographically contingent.23 One of the fundamental criticisms of 
the male/female gender binary is that gender is so much more; it is mul-
ti-vocal, multilingual, and multi-faceted. Attempts at inclusion mean 
LPSRVLQJGHÀQLWLRQVHVWDEOLVKLQJUHJXODWLRQV6XFKULJLGDSSURDFKHVGR
not work because they operate within the traditional categorical modes 
RIWKLQNLQJWKHUHE\HQJDJLQJWKHSROLWLFDOLQWKHSURFHVVRILGHQWLÀFD-
tion. Lise Gotell warns it is necessary for the judiciary to avoid such 
traps. In “Queering Law: Not by Vriend,” Gotell insists that, “in order 
to destabilize the neat divide between straight inside and queer outside, 
there is a pressing need to resist the strategic attractions of sexual iden-
tity politics.”24 Accordingly, and for other reasons, arguing human rights 
or section 15 Charter claims where a transgendered person is alleg-
21 Ibid. at 41.
22 Sherene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1998) at 11.
23 Vincent Leitch et al., “Michel Foucault: Introduction” Vincent Leitch, ed., Norton Anthology 
of Theory and Criticism (New York: Norton, 2001) 1615 at 1618. 
24 Lise Gotell, “Queering Law: Not by Vriend” (2002) 17 Can. J. L. & Soc’y 89 at 93. 
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edly discriminated under the purview of the enumerated or analogous 
grounds of sexual orientation, sex, or disability does not work. 
1. Sexual Orientation
Sexual orientation is simply an inadequate and improper ground upon 
which a transgendered person might advance a discrimination com-
plaint. Quite frankly, the two are barely, if at all, related. However, it 
is a common misconception of our society that the two are linked.25 
Bornstein notes that “those who practice non-traditional sex are seen 
by members of the dominant culture as a whole with those who don 
non-traditional gender roles and identities.”26 Despite our willingness 
to group that which does not conform to societal norms into an(other) 
category, we cannot deny that “there are straight transgendered people, 
gay transgendered people, and bisexual transgendered people” and that 
sexuality orientation is not contingent on one’s sex, either biological or 
self-perceived.27
In the American case Underwood v. Archer Management Services, 
a complaint brought forward by a transsexual person on the ground of 
sexual orientation was actually dismissed because it was devoid of any 
claim of discriminatory conduct based on the plaintiff’s real or per-
ceived preference or practice of sexuality. 28 The Court was correct to 
differentiate between the sex to which we are attracted and the sex, or 
lack thereof, with which we associate. Transgenderism and sexual ori-




Minnesota Statutes 1992, section 363.01 subd. 23 and 45 read: “Sexual orientation” means…
having, or being perceived as a having an orientation for such attachment, or having or being 
perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological 
maleness or femaleness.” 
26 Supra note 4 at 38.
27ÀQGOD\DQG/DIUDPERLVHVupra note 14 at 27.
28 857 F Supp 96 [D DC 1994].
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2. Sex
Unfortunately, Canadian jurisprudence has generally failed to embrace 
Butler’s understanding of gender and has, instead, adopted a notion of 
gender that is primarily essentialist, immutable, and inherently linked to 
sex. The Federal Court of Appeal, stated in Thibaudeau v. R. that, “sex 
GLIIHUVVLJQLÀFDQWO\IURPWKHRWKHUHQXPHUDWHGJURXQGVµ29 The case was 
a section 15(1) Charter claim challenging a provision of the Income Tax 
Act.30 In obiter, Hugessen J. went on to say that, “[t]here are only two 
sexes. One excludes the other. A male is always the opposite of a female 
and vice versa.” Likewise, in a footnote, Hugessen J. does not deny that 
“homosexuals or transsexuals [may] constitute a third or even a fourth 
sex,” and that such a decision “would necessarily do so on the basis that 
each of the sexual categories so found was exclusive of all others.”31 
Other than the fact that homosexuality or heterosexuality has lit-
tle to do with sex, there are other problems with these statements. The 
creation of a third or a fourth sex would merely create a paradigm that 
ZRXOGUHVKDSHWKHERXQGDULHVRIWKHJHQGHUSRZHUVWUXJJOHDQGUHDIÀUP
the gender hierarchy. Females and the transgendered other would still 
be subject to the dominating patriarchal discourse because of efforts 
at avoiding exclusionary practices. Furthermore, the two marginalized 
groups would be, and indeed are, forced to compete for space and voice. 
Most recently, this has been demonstrated in the case Nixon v. Vancou-
ver Rape Relief Society.32 
Kimberly Nixon is a male to female transsexual who claimed that 
Vancouver Rape Relief Society (hereinafter Rape Relief) denied her 
both a service and employment in violation of sections 8 and 13 of the 
British Columbia Human Rights Code33 on the basis of sex. Nixon was 
successful in her challenge at the tribunal, but that decision was later 
set aside at trial. Essentially, Nixon as a transgendered person who had 
gone through sex reassignment surgery (SRS) was denied the right to 
work as a peer counsellor at Rape Relief on the basis that she had not 
29 Thibaudeau v. R., [1994] 114 D.L.R. (4th) 261 at para. 23, 21 C.R.R. (2d) 35 (FCA), rev’d on 
other grounds [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (SCC) [Thibaudeau].
30 R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1.
31 Thibaudeau, supra note 29.
32 (2003), 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 254.
33 Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C., c. 210 (the “Code”).
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fully lived her life as a woman. “A woman,” Nixon was informed by 
Rape Relief, “had to be oppressed since birth to be a volunteer at Rape 
5HOLHIµDQGWKDWVKH1L[RQGLGQRWEHORQJWRWKDWSDUWLFXODULGHQWLÀDEOH
group.34 
As such, when Rape Relief concedes that, “sex is not a binary concept 
but a continuum” it is recognizing the complexity of physical changes 
that many transgendered persons may experience but it is not advocat-
ing an advantageous concept of gender.35 While creating a space for 
WUDQVJHQGHUHGVSHFLÀFDOO\WUDQVVH[XDOSHUVRQVWKLVFRQWLQXXPVHUYHV
merely to further complicate the hierarchy such that individuals will be 
considered “more of a woman” or “not woman enough.” Marginaliza-
WLRQWKHQWDNHVRQDQHZIRUPDVLQGLYLGXDOVDUHGHÀQHGE\WKHLUVH[XDO
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVZKLFKSODFHWKHPHLWKHULQVLGHRURXWVLGHRIDQLGHQWLÀ-
able group (woman since birth, woman post-SRS, cross-dressing men). 
Gender role and gender identity provide a background narrative that 
has little consequence in an assessment that is still grounded in sex and 
sexual identity politics.
In accepting Rape Relief’s arguments, the British Columbia Supreme 
Court also revisited the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. 
PowleyZKLFKGHWHUPLQHGKRZPHPEHUVKLSLQDQ´LGHQWLÀDEOHJURXSµ
PD\EHGHÀQHG36 Particularly, the Court discusses the third part of the 
test in Powley, which provides that “the core of community acceptance 
is past and ongoing participation in a shared culture, in the customs 
and traditions…[that] distinguish it from other groups.”37 Edwards J. 
observes, “If the Powley WHVWIRUDQ¶LGHQWLÀDEOHJURXS·ZHUHDSSOLHGLQ
WKLVFDVH0V1L[RQZRXOGEHH[FOXGHGIURP5DSH5HOLHI·VVHOIGHÀQHG
¶LGHQWLÀDEOH JURXS· RIZRPHQZKR KDYH DOZD\V OLYHG H[FOXVLYHO\ DV
girls and women…certainly on the community acceptance criterion.”38 
In this circumstance, the Powley test plays into the essentialist notion 
of gender, and therefore challenges the legitimacy of not only Nixon’s 
womanhood, but of her gender identity, by contemplating what Nixon 
is as opposed to who she is. In so doing, Nixon as a transgendered per-
VRQLVIRUFHGLQWRDGHÀQLWLRQZKLOHEHLQJIRUFHGRXWRIDQLGHQWLÀDEOH
34 Supra note 32 at 261.
35 Supra note 32 at 271.
36 (2003), 230 D.L.R. (4th) [Powley].
37 Ibid. at para. 33.
38 Supra note 32 at 274.
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group. Nixon is subjected to a political power struggle whereby Rape 
Relief’s efforts to empower women are deemed incompatible with, and 
even superior to, the rights of an individual that is ‘less’ than a woman.
Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief is not the only Canadian case in 
recent history to grapple with issue of incorporating transgenderism un-
der the enumerated ground of sex. In Sheridan v. Sanctuary Investments 
Ltd. (No. 3), a pre-operative transsexual woman, Tawni Sheridan, was 
refused use of the women’s washroom in a bar despite having a letter 
from the gender clinic which was treating her saying that she was re-
quired to live full-time as a woman for two years as a condition of her 
sex reassignment surgery.39 Tribunal Member Humphreys ultimately 
found that there was discrimination and that Sheridan was entitled to 
use the women’s washroom. In delivering the decision, the Tribunal ac-
knowledged that “the law…assumes that sex is a bipolar characteristic 
and that an individual is either male or female” but that “given the large 
and liberal interpretation which the Supreme Court of Canada has em-
phasized must be applied to human rights legislation…discrimination 
against a transsexual constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.”40 
Similarly, in New York Supreme Court case Maffei v. Kolaeton In-
dustry Ltd., Lehner JSC. rules that transsexualism will fall under sex 
as a prohibited ground of discrimination because “although…a person 
may have both male and female characteristics, society only recognizes 
two sexes” such that a transsexual may be a “sub-group” of either men 
or women, accordingly.41 
The United Kingdom’s jurisprudence walks the same path as a the 
Canadian and American courts. In P. v. S. and Cornwall County Coun-
cil, where a town manager is to be dismissed for having undergone SRS, 
“the United Kingdom and the Commission submit that to dismiss a per-
son because he or she is a transsexual or because he or she has undergone 
a gender-reassignment operation does not constitute sex discrimination 
for the purposes of the directive.”42 The Court of Justice of the European 
39 (1999), 33 C.H.R.R. D/467, [1999] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 43 (QL) (B.C. Trib.) [Sheridan cited 
to C.H.R.R.].
40 Ibid. at paras. 91 and 93. This reasoning was later adopted by the British Columbia Human 
Rights Tribunal in Mamela v. Vancouver Lesbian Connection (1999), 36 C.H.R.R. D/318 (B.C. 
Trib).
41 626 N.Y.S. 2d 391, 1995 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 115, at 556.
42 [1996] NLOR No. 3408 at para. 14.
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Communities ultimately rejected the argument, ruling it contrary to the 
dignity and freedom of a person to discriminate a person because she 
falls outside of the man/woman dichotomy. 
In keeping with the trends in Canadian and International jurispru-
dence, the Ontario Human Rights Council (OHRC) adopted a Policy on 
Discrimination and Harassment because of Gender Identity that sup-
ports “a progressive understanding of the ground ‘sex’ to include ‘gen-
der identity.’”43 The OHRC Policy is correct and clear in differentiating 
gender identity from sexual orientation but in its “purposive and liberal 
interpretation of the ground of sex,” the OHRC Policy demonstrates its 
lack of appreciation for the political power struggle that underlies the 
enumerated ground of sex.44 The Ontario Human Rights Commission is 
not, or is choosing not to be, cognisant of the inherent restrictions of the 
JHQGHUELQDU\EXWPRUHVSHFLÀFDOO\RIWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKWKHELQDU\
PDUJLQDOL]HVWKRVHZKRDUHQRWDSHUIHFWÀW,QSDUWLFXODUWKH&RPPLV-
sion says in its policy that it is committed to “promoting the dignity and 
equality of those whose gender does not conform to traditional social 
norms.”45 Already it is quite clear that transgendered persons are merely 
being regulated into a category not because they identify with it, but be-
cause they do not. The language suggests that transgendered people are 
being protected because they are different and that there is a dominant 
social identity against which they are being compared. 
Like the aforementioned case law, the Ontario Human Rights Com-
mission bases its anti-discrimination efforts on methods of categori-
zation that make assignments of similarity and difference. Nitya Iyer 
observes that “legal categories tend to assign two sorts of difference: 
difference as distinction and difference as hierarchy.”46 The former in-
dicates difference as “an expression of a relationship,” that difference 
cannot exist in isolation.47 A person is tall because there is someone who 
is short. I am male by virtue of the fact that I am not that which my sis-
ter is: female. Such distinctions allow us to form the categories which 
43 Ontario, Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Discrimination and Harassment be-
cause of Gender Identity (Toronto: OHRC, 2001) at 1.
44 Ibid. at 4.
45 Ibid. at 2 [emphasis added].
46 Nita Iyer, “Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity” (1993) 
19 Queen’s L.J. 179 at 183. 
47 Ibid. at 185.
MANY FACES . . . 213 
are the driving mechanisms of anti-discrimination law, but that are also 
the basis of difference as hierarchy. These categories inevitably express 
hierarchal relationships and assertions of power.48 In the case of sex, 
the dominant sexual identity is embedded in the basic social structure 
VRWKDWWKHEDFNJURXQGQRUPLVVROLGLÀHGDQGLVWKHUHIRUHSHUSHWXDOO\
male. ‘Male’ retains power by having ‘female’ as a basis of distinction, 
as a second link in a hierarchal structure. The incorporation of the third, 
of the transgendered, does not detract from that power as it gains space 
in the gender binary only as an exception. “In the contemporary legal 
GLVFRXUVHµDUJXHV*RWHOO´WKHVROLGLÀFDWLRQRILGHQWLW\FDWHJRULHVEH-
comes a means by which groups who depart from the silent…norm are 
reduced to a characteristic that both contains and constitutes them.”49 
By creating an exception that exists both inside and outside of the gen-
dered hierarchy, the governing discourse has established a stable minor-
ity that requires its protection that needs advocacy, and compassion. 
Consequently, whether at the hands of legislatures, administrative deci-
sion makers, or the judiciary, the power struggle is won in the guise of 
protecting the position of the status quo, and it is in this way that the 
dominant social identities are able to resist change.
3. Disability
That a complaint of discrimination against a transgendered person 
would be grounded in the ground of disability is a testament to early 
and contemporary notions of transgenderism as a disease or disorder. 
Gender Identity Disorder (GID), also termed gender dysphoria, is listed 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV), published by the American Psychiatric Association (302.6 and 
302.85).50 Gender experts have also devised a set of guidelines called 
The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association’s 
Standards of Care For Gender Identity Disorder. This universal con-
sensus gives medical professionals a set of guidelines by which they 
48 Ibid. at 185. 
49 Supra note 24 at 108.
50 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) [DSM-IV]. Homosexuality had been removed from the publica-
tion in 1973, but it has since been restored with respect to those who suffer with their homosexu-
ality in a homophobic society.
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may manage patients seeking hormones and surgery.51 Unfortunately, 
transgendered people are also impaired by the treatment they receive in 
society, through social alienation and a denial of access to social pro-
grams.52ÀQGOD\DQG/DIUDPERLVHVXJJHVWWKDWLIDWUDQVJHQGHUHGSHUVRQ
is affected to some degree by gender dysphoria and any related psycho-
logical complications, “their lifelong condition can be recognized as a 
medical condition, a condition that can be diagnosed and potentially 
treated through medical intervention.”53 To that end, it seems that all 
WUDQVJHQGHUHGSHRSOHVKRXOGÀQGSURWHFWLRQLQWKHJURXQGRIGLVDELOLW\
in human rights legislation. 
Synthia Kavanagh, a male to female transsexual, was successful in 
her discrimination claim on the grounds of both sex and disability in the 
case Kavanagh v. Canada (AG). 54 Kavanagh, who had been living as a 
woman, was convicted of second degree murder and was consequently 
incarcerated in a male federal prison, despite the recommendation of the 
judge that she be placed in a female prison. Kavanagh claimed that, as a 
transgendered person, she was denied both her regular hormonal treat-
ment and her sex reassignment surgery, for which she was preparing. 
Furthermore, she argued her dignity and freedoms were being infringed 
by being placed in a male prison. Ms. Kavanagh was successful in all 
her complaints, on both the grounds of sex and disability.55 
Likewise, Leslie Ferris, a transgendered person, was successful in 
her complaint of discrimination on the basis of “sex and/or disability” 
for being denied access to the women’s washroom at her workplace.56 
Tribunal Member Iyer observed that both sex and disability were rea-
sonable grounds upon which to base a discrimination claim. The judg-
PHQWQRWHV´,KDYHGLIÀFXOW\DFFHSWLQJWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWUHFRJQL]LQJ
discrimination because of transgendered status as discrimination on the 
51 ´%HFRPLQJ$\GHQµ WKHÀIWK HVWDWH 2FWREHU  RQOLQH&%&FDKWWSZZZFEF
FDÀIWKEHFRPLQJD\GHQPHGLFDOKWPO!
52 In Kavanagh v. Canada (AG) (2000), 41 C.H.R.R. D/119 [Kavanagh], the Canadian Human 
Rights Tribunal describes the tremendous torment, including the social ostracism, suffered by 
individuals who perceive their bodies as incongruent with their subjective sense of who they 
really are.
53 Supra note 14 at 25.
54 Supra note 50.
55 Supra note 50 at paras. 5-9.
56 )HUULVY2IÀFHDQG7HFKQLFDO(PSOR\HHV8QLRQ/RFDO (1999), 36 C.H.R.R. D/329 at para. 
1 (BC HRT).
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EDVLVRISK\VLFDOGLVDELOLW\LVVRPHKRZOHVVGLJQLÀHGWKDQUHFRJQL]LQJ
it as discrimination on the basis of sex.”57 Despite the reassurances of 
the Tribunal, it seems likely that there is a greater issue at large that 
would make disability an undesirable ground upon which a transgen-
dered person might pursue a discrimination claim. That there is even the 
suggestion of a hierarchy among grounds requires further investigation 
into disability. 
The case law indicates that disability is a mirror with many faces. 
That is, disability is not only determined by a person’s self-perception, 
EXWHTXDOO\E\WKHSHUFHSWLRQVDQGSUHMXGLFHVRIRWKHUVÀQGOD\DQG/D-
framboise note that, “To constitute a disability, a condition does not 
have to “inherently impair” the individual…It is the discrimination on 
the basis of the function which brings it under the disability umbrella 
rather than a necessary impairment of function.”58 Furthermore, a per-
son need not actually be disabled if she is perceived to be disabled and 
is discriminated on that basis.59 
There are a number of points to consider here. Certainly, for the 
individual, the opportunity to succeed in the assertion of a particular 
complaint on the ground of disability is, admittedly, quite appealing. It 
RIIHUVERWKDIÀUPDWLRQWKDW\RXUULJKWVZHUHYLRODWHGDQGYLQGLFDWLRQWR
the extent that your disorder is no longer your fault. For a transgendered 
person to succeed on a claim of disability acknowledges transgender-
ism as a disorder that is beyond the control of the claimant, but that is 
very real. Success at the tribunal level or in the courts would solidify the 
disorder. Other victories would follow, possibly lending credibility to 
VWUXJJOHVIRUÀQDQFLDOFRYHUDJHRIPHGLFDOELOOVDQG656DQGRSHQLQJ
doors to other disabled communities, resources, and funding.60
However, the victory is perhaps a little short-sighted. Ultimately, it is 
necessary to consider the political and power-based effects of transgen-
derism as a disability. Disability is generally not perceived as positive. 
Indeed, that is the very reason why it is labelled as a ground needing 
SURWHFWLRQ0HUULDP:HEVWHU2QOLQHGHÀQHVGLVDELOLW\DV´DGLVTXDOLÀ-
57 Ibid. at para. 85.
58 Supra note 14 at 25.
59 Hamlyn v. Cominco Ltd. (1989), 11 C.H.R.R. D/333 (B.C.C.H.R). The complainant’s rights 
were violated by her employer who discriminated against her because her obesity was perceived 
as a disability, despite the complainant’s thoughts to the contrary. 
60ÀQGOD\DQG/DIUDPERLVHVupra note 14 at 26.
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cation, restriction, or disadvantage.”617RDSSURSULDWHVXFKDGHÀQLWLRQ
DV D VHOIGHÀQLQJ TXDOLW\ WKH WUDQVJHQGHUHG FRPPXQLW\ LV FRQFHGLQJ
that transgenderism is, at its origins, a problem, thereby alleviating the 
pressure on society to change its views, to reshape the dominant dis-
course. If effect, as self-proclaimed disabled persons, transgendered 
people who pursue discrimination claims on the grounds of disability 
position themselves at the lower end of the political hierarchy.
As with the ground of sex, any discrimination claim based on dis-
ability must contend with a rigid and power-driven hierarchy. Richard 
Devlin and Dianne Pothier observe that “historically, we have tended to 
adopt a binary conception of disability: there are the disabled and the 
able-bodied.”62 Similar to the male/female gender binary, the binary ap-
proach to disability generates a philosophy of I am that I am that you are 
not, which is akin to Iyer’s description of “difference as distinction.”63 
7KHGRPLQDQWDEOHERGLHGGLVFRXUVHGHÀQHVLWVHOILQRSSRVLWLRQWRWKRVH
who are disabled, who “need” protection, and who are inevitably denied 
space and voice. To that end, “difference as hierarchy” is engaged such 
that the power rests with the able-bodied majority while the disabled are 
powerless and marginalized.64 The able-bodied majority are left to de-
termine “the performance benchmarks we utilize to assess people” and 
continue with “its oppressive characterization of an impairment.”65 
Transgendered as disabled in anti-discrimination law simply offers 
more problems than its potential successes are worth. As a course of 
action “it is inconsistent with a political strategy that demands society 
change its idea of normal and healthy and non-disabled to include trans-
gendered people, rather than to continue to treat them as aberrations, 
which in turn reinforces the mistreatment they receive.”66 As a ground 
of discrimination, it actually robs transgendered people of autonomy. 
Politically, legally, and socially, the situation is complicated not only 
by the complexity of a myriad of perceived gender identities, but of the 
61 Merriam Webster Inc., “Disability,” online <http://www.merriamwebster.com>.
62 Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier, “Introduction: Toward a Critical Theory of Disitizen-
ship” in Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier, Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, 
Politics, Policy and Law [publication forthcoming from U.B.C. Press].
63 Supra note 46.
64 Supra note 46.
65 Supra note 60.
66 Findlay and Laframboise, supra note 14 at 26.
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LQFUHDVLQJO\QXDQFHGPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQH[SHULHQFHGE\QRWÀWWLQJLQWRWKH
male/female gender binary because of a disability. 
III. OPEN GROUND
“What’s convenient for the government 
is that they keep this scapegoat called the queer voice.
Silence does equal death – and we are being silenced.”
— Lori E. Seid, Producer Taboo [emphasis added]
Having established that grounds are necessary and core to anti-discrimi-
nation law, and that neither sexual orientation, nor sex, nor disability are 
adequate or appropriate grounds on which transgendered persons should 
advance discrimination complaints, it remains to proffer a ground which 
may prove adequate. Indeed, the establishment of gender identity as an 
LQGHSHQGHQWSURWHFWHGJURXQGRIIHUVERWKDQLQFOXVLYHDQGÁXLGVSDFH
for transgendered people to pursue discrimination claims, and a space 
which is void of inherent hierarchies. 
There is no doubt that transgendered people, those who experience 
all levels of gender dysphoria, need a discursive space of their own 
within the framework of Canadian anti-discrimination laws. Dianne 
Pothier insists, “the conception of the ground has to be apparent.”67 Ac-
cordingly, it is necessary that the ground be established to explicitly pro-
tect all persons who experience gender dysphoria, whether transsexual 
or transvestite, gender blender or gender bender. Moreover, the ground 
of gender identity must be determined by the interests of those it is 
GHVLJQHGWRSURWHFWLWPXVWEHRSHQG\QDPLFÁXLG.HHSLQJ%XWOHULQ
mind, constructing a transgendered space necessarily requires a lack of 
borders and responsiveness to a person’s self-perceived gender identity, 
and not their apparent sex. Transgendered persons should not be forced 
WRFDWHJRUL]HWKHPVHOYHVWRÀWLQWRGHÀQLWLRQVSDUDGLJPVRUDQ\RWKHU
politically devised construct. 
By virtue of its design, the ground of gender identity as a space 
for transgendered persons within landscape of anti-discrimination law 
should be void of inherent hierarchies. The creation of the space decon-
67 Supra note 20 at 49. 
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structs both difference as distinction and difference as hierarchy faced 
within the boundaries of both sex and disability. The comparisons and 
the rigid constructions will still exist in those grounds. However, the 
establishment of gender identity as a ground relocates transgendered 
people on a parallel plane, affording them rights protection on their own 
terms. 
Kate Bornstein says that “the correct target for any transsexual re-
bellion would be the gender system itself. But transsexuals won’t attack 
that system until they themselves are free of the need to participate in 
it.”687KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIJHQGHULGHQWLW\ZRXOGEHDÀUVWVWHSLQWKDW
direction, toward a rebellion located in anti-discrimination law, fought 
on the principles of equality.
There is room in human rights legislation to change the gender sys-
tem, to help not only cure but prevent the discrimination of transgen-
dered people. For example, the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act states in 
section 24(1)(b), “The Commission shall develop a program of public 
LQIRUPDWLRQDQGHGXFDWLRQLQWKHÀHOGRIKXPDQULJKWVWRIRUZDUGWKH
principle that every person is free and equal in dignity and rights…”69 
That particular section, and sections 24(1)(c-f) would provide many 
other opportunities for the promulgation of transgender issues and the 
balancing of the gender power struggle. Legal institutions have an op-
portunity to engage in a dialogue geared toward understanding and ac-
ceptance, synthesizing the theoretical, medical, cultural and historical. 
Furthermore, human rights commissions have a statute-based obligation 
to move beyond dialogue to effect change.
IV. CONCLUSION
Alice laughed: “There’s no use trying,” she said; “one can’t believe 
impossible things.” “I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said 
the Queen. “When I was younger, I always did it for half an hour a 
day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things 
before breakfast.”
— Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 
68 Supra note 4 at 83.
69 R.S.N.S., c. 214, s. 1.
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*HQGHULVDGLIÀFXOWWKLQJWRFKDQJH,QGHHGZKDWH[DFWO\DUHZHFKDQJ-
ing when we change gender? Kate Bornstein writes, “As I looked at 
JHQGHU,QHHGHGWRÀ[LWZLWKDGHÀQLWLRQMXVWORQJHQRXJKIRUPHWR
UHDOL]HWKDWHDFKGHÀQLWLRQ,FDPHXSZLWKZDVHQWLUHO\LQDGHTXDWHDQG
needed to be abandoned in search of a deeper meaning.”70 The history 
of gender is indicative of its multifarious manifestations throughout cul-
ture and geography and its importance to social and political issues of 
anti-discrimination law. 
Transgender is not the invention of a politically contentious and in-
creasingly complicated society. Transgender is not a protest mechanism, 
nor a fashionable social deviance. Rather, its very origins are within our 
social constructions of gender and society’s construction of the subject. 
From the moment our biological sex is proclaimed, we become a site of 
construction, shaped by the relationships inherent to a politically charged 
power struggle over gender-based discursive space. In real practice, this 
entails the marginalization of the gender other, the transgender commu-
nity, and often competition between marginal groups, such as women 
and homosexuals, in favour of a dominant heterosexual patriarchy. 
While Queer Theory attempts to subvert this rigid practice of mar-
ginalization and oppression, it can only succeed insofar as its narrative 
is adopted by the power-based structures of our society. Shauna Lab-
man argues that “the law has the ability to both mirror and construct 
social norms.”71 The recent case law, law reform reports, and legal com-
mentary would suggest that the rights of transgender persons are being 
recognized within the operation of anti-discrimination law. However, 
VXFKUHFRJQLWLRQFRPHVDWWKHSULFHRIEHLQJGHÀQHGE\DQGVXEMHFWHG
to a discourse which does not appreciate the transgender perception of 
self. Instead, the current legal discourse is based upon a philosophy of 
FDWHJRULFDOWKLQNLQJLQWHQWXSRQUHÁHFWLQJLWVRZQYLHZVRIJHQGHURQ
transgender persons. As such, the legal discourse, while generally ex-
hibiting good intentions, is limiting the ground upon which transgender 
rights can be fully recognized outside of existing political power strug-
gles inherent to both sex and disability.
70 Supra note 4 at 21.
71 Shauna Labman, “Left in Legal Limbo: Transsexual Identity and the Law” (2001) 7 Appeal 
66 at 72.
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By adopting a Queer Theory approach to gender identity, and by 
establishing gender identity as a protected ground of discrimination, 
DQWLGLVFULPLQDWLRQODZLQ&DQDGDZLOOEHPDNLQJLWVÀUVWSDUWLFLSDWRU\
steps in deconstructing the rigidity of gender. Effectively, the creation of 
space for transgender through gender identity would change the balance 
of power by placing identity in the hands of the transgender community. 
Fluid, dynamic, and realistic, the self-described notions of gender iden-
tity would empower the marginalized discourse. To change power, of 
course, is to change gender.
